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I. Introduction 
On September 1, 1914, Martha, the last surviving passenger 
pigeon, died at the Cincinnati Zoo.1 Martha’s death marked the 
end of a species that was once the most populous bird in the 
United States, perhaps even the world.2 In the centuries prior, 
the passenger pigeon had flown in flocks so thick that “hunting 
was easy—even waving a pole at the low-flying birds would kill 
some,” and it nested by the thousands, routinely taking over 
forests and snapping branches with the weight of their nests.3 In 
1857, when a state legislature proposed a bill to protect the 
passenger pigeon, a Select Committee of the Senate rejected the 
proposal, stating “[t]he passenger pigeon needs no protection. 
Wonderfully prolific . . . it is here today and elsewhere tomorrow, 
and no ordinary destruction can lessen them, or be missed from 
the myriads that are yearly produced.”4 
Despite this bold declaration, in less than a hundred years 
the passenger pigeon was hunted to extinction.5 “Researchers 
have agreed that the bird was hunted out of existence, victimized 
by the fallacy that no amount of exploitation could endanger a 
creature so abundant.”6 Conservationists and lawmakers at the 
turn of the century realized that even the most prolific of birds 
could be wiped out by overhunting and exploitation, and a 
                                                                                                     
 1. Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON 
(May–June 2014), http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2014/why-
passenger-pigeon-went-extinct (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See id. (describing the large numbers of passenger pigeons and the 
impact the massive flocks had on society in the 1800s and early 1900s). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial 1916–2016, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/mbtreaty100/timeline.php (last updated Jan. 
26, 2016) (last visited Nov. 25, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 5. Yeoman, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
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movement quickly grew to save “interesting species from possible 
extinction.”7 
This movement culminated in the passing of the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).8 In many ways, the MBTA has been a 
success—the act stopped the wholesale slaughter of birds and 
unregulated hunting of many affected species of birds, allowing 
them to recover.9 However, since its passing nearly a century ago, 
the MBTA has struggled to keep up with modern developments in 
industry.10 Originally designed to combat the evils of 
overhunting, the MBTA has not adapted easily to regulating 
more modern threats to birds, which include buildings, power 
lines, and wind turbines.11 Commentators have criticized the 
MBTA as being both under-enforced and over-inclusive, with 
courts and regulators disagreeing on how the MBTA can be used 
to combat these modern threats.12 
                                                                                                     
 7. KURKPATRICK DORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY 165 
(1998). 
 8. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2006). 
 9. See Jennifer Howard, Celebrating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Pact 
That Transcends Borders, AMER. BIRD CONSERVANCY (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://abcbirds.org/celebrating-the-migratory-bird-treaty-a-pact-that-
transcends-borders/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (speaking to the “remarkable” 
success of the MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Incidental Taking Under 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 
(2013) (“The almost century-old Migratory Bird Treaty Act is straining to fulfill 
its statutory purpose of protecting migratory birds from the changing and 
growing threats of modern industrial society.”); Gloria Dickie, Will the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act Survive in the Modern Era?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/issues/47.18/green-energys-dirty-secret/will-
the-migratory-bird-treaty-act-survive-in-the-modern-era (last visited Jan. 7, 
2017) (speaking to the serious challenges facing the MBTA following the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision that narrowly interpreted the Act) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Migratory Bird Mortality: How Many Human-Caused Threats 
Afflict Our Bird Populations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 2002), 
https://www.bakerenergyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2015/09/2002_ 
FWS-BIRD-MORTALITY-STUDY.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (detailing the 
anthropogenic threats to birds that greatly strain the bird populations) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Compare Ogden, supra note 10, at 1 (arguing that the MBTA is 
under-enforced and that the Fish and Wildlife Service should take more action 
against incidental take offenders), with Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting 
Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 824 (1998) (arguing that the MBTA should be 
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Much of the difficulty in understanding the scope of the 
MBTA arises from inconsistent interpretations of one of its main 
provisions prohibiting the “taking” of migratory birds.13 
Consequently, a circuit court split has developed over whether 
the term “taking” includes killings that are incidental to 
otherwise lawful activities.14 The Fifth Circuit has issued the 
most recent opinion on the issue, in which it interpreted the word 
very narrowly in finding that a violation of the MBTA must 
involve the “intentional killing” of a known migratory bird.15 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit’s interpretation created strict 
liability for bird deaths, finding that any killing of a migratory 
bird was a violation, whether it was incidental, accidental, or 
unintentional.16  
One result of the various interpretations of the meaning of 
“take” is that the MBTA is inconsistently enforced, leading to 
uncertainty over what type of conduct qualifies as an illegal 
                                                                                                     
interpreted narrowly). 
 13. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratory-
bird-treaty-act.php (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See Maxel Moreland, Migratory Bird Act: What Does Taking Mean?, 
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), https://uclawreview.org/2015/12/08/migratory-
bird-act-what-does-taking-mean/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (describing the split 
in interpretations of the word “taking” and arguing that the Fifth Circuit 
interpretation of “take” is the more persuasive interpretation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). For the purposes of this Note, the terms 
“incidental take” and “incidental taking” are used interchangeably. Both are 
terms of art derived from the definition of incidental take in the Endangered 
Species Act, which is “take that is incidental to, but not the purpose of, 
otherwise lawful activity.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 
(1982). This is the definition of incidental take or taking that applies to this 
paper.  
 15. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (“[W]e agree with the Eighth and Ninth circuits that a ‘taking’ is 
limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds. Our 
conclusion is based on the statute’s text, its common law origin, a comparison 
with other relevant statutes . . . .”). 
 16. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(“Imposing strict liability on FMC in this case does not dictate that every death 
of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party. However, 
here the statute does not include as an element of the offense ‘wilfully, 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently . . . .’”). 
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“taking.”17 In turn, this uncertainty has a detrimental affect on 
businesses, as many industrial projects necessarily have some 
incidental taking while operating.18  
In response to this uncertainty, and growing concerns about 
how the MBTA is enforced, 19 in 2015, the Department of the 
Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) issued a notice 
of intent in the Federal Register to prepare a programmatic 
environmental impact statement.20 According to the notice, the 
departments are considering rulemaking to address the 
incidental take of migratory birds, and “to provide legal clarity to 
Federal and State agencies, industry, and the public regarding 
compliance with the MBTA.”21  
While the FWS’s proposed undertaking is commendable, 
several problems with the proposal could undermine its purpose. 
Significantly, many commentators anticipate that challenges to 
the rulemaking will “bring to a head the threshold question of 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 11 (“[T]he FWS’s current ‘carrot and stick’ 
practice of incentivizing compliance with non-regulatory ‘guidelines’ intended to 
mitigate incidental taking with vague assurances of prosecutorial discretion 
results in an uneven and inconsistent enforcement of the law.”). 
 18. See Shippen Howe, The Intersection of the Migratory Bird Act and 
Energy Companies: An Uncertain Crossroad, VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP (May 
2010), http://www.vnf.com/703 (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (“Although the 
statute appears largely to be directed at hunters, it has been used to impose 
strict, misdemeanor liability on energy companies and has had repercussions on 
energy companies that intend to build new infrastructure.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See id. (noting that the increasing number of bird deaths from 
industrial activity has prompted the rulemaking, as well as the need to provide 
better legal certainty to affected industries); see also Nora Pincus, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service Announces Notice of Intent to Prepare Rulemaking for Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act Incidental Take Permits, WELLBURN, SULLIVAN, MECK & TOOLEY 
P.C. BLOG (July 9, 2015), http://www.wsmtlaw.com/blog/u-s-fish-and-wildlife-
service-announces-notice-of-intent-to-prepare-rulemaking-for-migratory-bird-
treaty-act-incidental-take-permits.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (stating that 
the MBTA currently does not have a mechanism for protection from prosecution 
for harm caused by common commercial and industrial activities, and the new 
proposal could provide some protections to industry) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See generally Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. 30032 (proposed May 26, 2015), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/05/26/2015-12666/migratory-bird-
permits-programmatic-environmental-impact-statement (last visited Mar. 2, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. Id. 
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whether the MBTA even applies to incidental take.”22 Indeed, 
many argue that the FWS does not have the authority to regulate 
incidental taking of migratory birds protected under the MBTA 
because incidental taking is not prohibited by the MBTA.23 The 
question of whether the MBTA applies to incidental take will 
have to be answered if FWS is to move forward with the 
rulemaking: FWS can only act pursuant to its congressionally 
delegated authority under the statute; if the MBTA does not 
cover incidental take, then FWS does not have the authority to 
regulate it.24 
Following this introduction, Part II of this Note describes the 
history of the MBTA and the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, as well as its mechanics.25 Part III details the circuit 
split caused by varying judicial interpretations of the Act, the 
current regulatory landscape, and the impact of the current legal 
landscape on industry.26 Part IV then discusses the 2015 proposal 
of the FWS and the problematic nature of the proposal.27 Finally, 
Part V of this Note argues for a different solution to resolving the 
circuit split: a legislative amendment to the Act clarifying 
whether the MBTA covers incidental taking of birds.28 
                                                                                                     
 22. Andrew Bell, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Proposes Incidental Take Rule for 
Migratory Birds, MARTEN LAW (June 17, 2015), http://www.martenlaw.com/ 
newsletter/20150617-incidental-take-migratory-birds (last visited Sept. 20, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. See Moreland, supra note 14 (“The original enacting Congress likely 
meant to stop humans from purposefully taking these migratory 
birds . . . . [T]he 1918 Congress likely meant the traditional common law 
meaning of the word ‘take,’ [reinforcing the Fifth Circuit’s holding] that 
Congress did not extend the MBTA to include incidental bird deaths.”). 
 24. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that a reviewing court may set aside 
an agency action that is made in excess of statutory authority). 
 25. Infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 26. Infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 27. Infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
 28. Infra Part V and accompanying notes. 
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II. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
A. The Birth of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The extinction of the passenger pigeon was, sadly, just one of 
many warnings that conservation laws were needed to save 
native bird species.29 Hunting for sport had become a popular 
pastime by the turn of the twentieth century, and the “increasing 
accessibility of the countryside severely reduced the undisturbed 
habitat where animals could hide, and better transportation 
allowed hunters to get to even the most remote area.”30 Hunting 
magazines “carried articles glorifying unrestrained slaughter” of 
migratory birds, and hunters filled railroad cars with dead 
pigeons.31 Additionally, in response to the demand for fashionable 
feather hats, “the market for birds was dominated by the 
enormous demand . . . for feathers by the millinery industry.”32 
Overhunting threatened not only birds, but seals, fish, and the 
American bison.33 
In response to these losses, a conservation movement grew.34 
Audubon societies formed as bird lovers became concerned about 
the fate of species that were once prevalent throughout the 
                                                                                                     
 29. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 165 (explaining that the conviction “that 
wild birds were declining to the point that irreversible danger would occur” was 
strengthened by the extinction of the passenger pigeon and the near extinction 
of other species). 
 30. Id. at 172. 
 31. Id. at 170–71. 
 32. Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
MICH. ST. UNIV. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2014), https://www.animallaw.info/ 
article/detailed-discussion-migratory-bird-treaty-act (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also DORSEY, supra note 
7, at 178–79 (discussing how the fashion trend that began with wearing feather 
hats transitioned into wearing entire birds on hats, which drove up the prices of 
certain birds, driving several species nearly to extinction). 
 33. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 12–14 (detailing how the demise of the 
passenger pigeon and the bison provided an impetus for a conservation 
movement to protect birds, fish, and seals). 
 34. See id. at 176–177 (discussing the growth of a bird conservation 
movement that grew in reaction to the destruction of many natural species); see 
generally Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4 (providing a timeline 
that notes the emergence of protectionist groups around the turn of the 20th 
century). 
288 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 281 (2018) 
United States.35 The Audubon societies lobbied the states for 
legislation to restrict hunting, and persuaded ladies to “forgo the 
cruelly harvested plumage” that decorated their hats.36 In 1900, 
Congress “made a ‘very cautious first step [into] the field of 
federal wildlife regulation’” by passing the Lacey Act.37 The Lacey 
Act, authorized by the Commerce Clause, made the interstate 
transport of wild animals or birds in violation of state law a 
federal crime.38 Then in 1913, Congress passed its first national 
wildlife conservation law, the Weeks–McLean Act, which declared 
“all migratory games and insectivorous birds ‘to be within the 
custody and protection of the United States.’”39  Although the Act 
was immediately challenged for constitutional deficiencies,40 it 
paved the way for more lasting legislation.41 
It was against this backdrop that the United States and 
Great Britain, on behalf of Canada, negotiated for a treaty to 
protect migratory birds.42 Despite heavy opposition, Congress 
                                                                                                     
 35. See id. at 179 (describing how Audubon societies grew in strength and 
vilified the use of birds on hats); see also Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, 
supra note 4 (speaking to the creation of various Audubon societies across the 
United States). 
 36. Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4; see also Rozan, 
Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (explaining that the authority of the states to 
regulate hunting had been reinforced by the Supreme Court in 1896 when they 
held “that the states owned the wild animals within their borders in trust for 
their residents . . . .”). 
 37. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN & 
MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 79 (3d ed. 
1997)); see also DORSEY, supra note 7, at 180–81 (“In today’s atmosphere of 
pervasive federal environmental laws, the Lacey Act seems frightfully 
weak . . . . But by passing it, Congress had agreed that the depredation of 
America’s wildlife was not sustainable or acceptable.”). 
 38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371–3378 (2012). 
 39. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (citing Weeks-McLean Act of 
Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828 (superseded by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2006)). 
 40. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294–95 (D. Kan. 1915) 
(finding that the Weeks Act was not authorized by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution). 
 41. See DORSEY, supra note 7, at 188–89 (explaining that the 
Weeks-McLean Act opened the door for the MBTA as “Canadian 
conservationists saw the passage of Weeks-McLean as an opportunity to work 
with Americans to create a mutual scheme to protect birds”). 
 42. See id. at 192–214 (describing at length the negotiations and 
considerations that went into the signing of the Migratory Bird Treaty and 
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ratified the Migratory Bird Treaty in 1916, much to the joy of 
bird lovers and conservationists. 43 The treaty governs migratory 
birds in the United States and Canada, with the intent of “saving 
from indiscriminate slaughter and of insuring the preservation of 
such migratory birds as are either useful to man or are 
harmless . . . .”44 The treaty went on to serve as a model for 
similar treaties with Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union.45 
B. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
To implement the new accord with Canada, Congress passed 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.46 Under the MBTA it is  
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to 
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or 
kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to 
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, 
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for 
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or 
cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, 
carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg 
of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, 
which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such 
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . . 47  
                                                                                                     
asserting that the failure of the Weeks-McLean Act was a driving in the 
negotiations). 
 43. See id. at 206–13 (detailing the problems encountered by the 
conservationists when the treaty arrived for ratification in Washington, in 
particular from groups in Missouri that would go on to challenge the MBTA). 
 44. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.–U.K., Aug. 16, 
1916, 39 Stat. 1702. 
 45. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 192 
(2009) (providing details of the treaties between Mexico, Japan, and the USSR); 
see generally Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game 
Mammals, U.S.–Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311; Convention for the Protection 
of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, 
U.S.–Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Convention Concerning the 
Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.–U.S.S.R., Nov. 
18, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647. 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); Migratory Bird Treaty Centennial, supra note 4. 
 47. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a), 704(a).  
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The MBTA has been amended several times since 1918.48 
Each time the United States entered into a new migratory bird 
treaty with another nation, the Act was updated to include the 
species covered by that new treaty.49 
The Act is unusual in that it creates a blanket prohibition on 
all actions that kill or harm migratory birds and subsequently 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits or 
regulations for “hunting, wildlife control, or other measures.”50 
Violators of the Act are subject to criminal penalties, which 
include fines and imprisonment.51 In 1960, the Act was amended 
to create separate misdemeanor and felony crimes.52 While the 
felony offenses require the actor to “knowingly” violate the 
MBTA, misdemeanor offenses, which are the focus of this article, 
are strict liability crimes.53  
The criminal structure of the MBTA can be explained by the 
desire of its framers “to put an end to the commercial trade in 
birds and their feathers that . . . had wreaked havoc on the 
populations of many native bird species.”54 The MBTA has been 
                                                                                                     
 48. Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service: Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. See The Evolution of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, AUDUBON SOC’Y 
(May 22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-evolution-migratory-bird-
treaty-act (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (providing a timeline of the evolution of 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 50. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 192 (“The Act’s initial prohibition is 
as broadly (and redundantly) phrased as the statute’s drafters could make it.”). 
 51. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 14–15 (explaining how the misdemeanor 
and felony violations of the MBTA interact). 
 52. Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–732, 74 Stat. 866 (amending the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act to increase the penalties for violation of the Act,); see 
also Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 (providing an overview of major 
amendments to the Act). 
 53. Ogden, supra note 10, at 14–15. Currently, the only felonies under the 
MBTA are the sale or taking with the intent to sell of MBTA-protected species. 
Id.  
 54. Ogden, supra note 10, at 6 (quoting A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of 
the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations.php (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2016) (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review)). 
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very successful in combating overhunting and poaching, and is 
credited with helping several species recover from near 
extinction.55 
An example of how the FWS has achieved this success is the 
Federal Duck Stamp Program. Under the MBTA, the killing and 
hunting of migratory birds is only permitted by the FWS under 
certain conditions. One of these conditions is all hunters of 
migratory waterfowl must purchase a Federal Duck Stamp prior 
to hunting.56 Ninety-eight percent of the proceeds from the 
purchase of a Duck Stamp goes to directly to migratory waterfowl 
conservation efforts.57 The program has been hugely successful: 
“Waterfowl hunting . . . is now generating funds to support 
waterfowl population recovery.”58 This is just one example of how 
the MBTA, and its related legislation, has been successful in 
conserving migratory birds. However, for all its successes, the 
MBTA’s construction has led to ambiguity that creates serious 
issues in enforcement of the Act against modern threats to 
birds.59 
1. Construction of the Migratory Bird Act 
The MBTA is a broad criminal statute that makes it illegal 
for anyone to interfere with protected migratory birds, absent a 
permit.60 A species is protected under the Act if it meets one of 
the following criteria: (1) the species is covered by the Canadian 
Convention of 1916 (as amended in 1996); (2) the species is 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. (“For example, the Snowy Egret, once hunted extensively for its 
plumage, has rebounded due to the protections of the MBTA from dangerously 
low levels to an estimated current population of over 1.3 million 
individuals . . . .”). 
 56. History of the Federal Duck Stamp, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/get-involved/duck-stamp/history-of-the-federal-duck-
stamp.php (last updated Feb. 9, 2017) (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Alexandra Freeman, How Hunters and Artists Helped Save North 
America’s Waterfowl, CORNELL LAB BIRD ACAD. (2015), https://academy.allabout 
birds.org/duck-stamps/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 59. Infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 60. Supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
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covered by the Mexican Convention of 1936; (3) the species is 
listed in the annex of the Japanese Convention of 1972; or (4) the 
species is listed in the appendix to the Russian Convention of 
1976.61 The list is periodically revised, the most recent change 
being made in November 2013 when “when spellings were 
corrected, common names and scientific names were updated, and 
23 species were added and 4 were removed for a variety of 
reasons . . . .”62 The Act only protects native species, specifically 
“those that occur as a result of natural biological or ecological 
processes.”63 
The number of bird species covered by the MBTA is larger 
than one might think—it included 1,026 species of birds as of 
October 2016.64 Legally speaking, whether a covered species is 
actually migratory is irrelevant; a bird is a migratory if FWS 
designates it as protected under the Act in a list published in the 
Federal Register.65 While the list publication is a challengeable 
                                                                                                     
 61. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/ 
migratory-bird-treaty-act.php (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (last visited Nov. 27, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20; Rozan, Detailed Discussion, 
supra note 32; FWS Revised List of Migratory Birds, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,844 
(November 1, 2013). 
 63. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, supra note 61; see 
FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 194–95 (describing the legal battle behind the 
issue of the MBTA’s application to birds that are present in the United States 
only as a result of human efforts); see also Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (considering whether the failure to include the mute swan as a 
protected bird under the MBTA was arbitrary and capricious), superseded by 
statute, Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 
(2004) as recognized in Pub. Emp. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 
1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 64. Kristina Rozan, Brief Summary of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, MICH. 
ST. UNIV. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2014), 
https://www.animallaw.info/intro/migratory-bird-treaty-act-mbta (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a 
complete list of all protected species, see generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
Protected Species: MBTA as of December 2, 2013, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/management/managed-species/migratory-bird-treaty-
act-protected-species.php (last updated Oct. 17, 2016) (last visited Nov. 28, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 45, at 192–93 (describing the types of 
migratory patterns of the species included in the Act, and declaring that the 
migratory pattern has little to do with whether a species is migratory under the 
Act). 
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agency action, once a species addition goes into effect “a person 
accused of violating the Act can not claim that a species was 
improperly included.”66 
The Secretary of the Interior is vested with the primary 
authority to administer and enforce the MBTA.67 The Secretary 
then delegates that responsibility to the FWS. The FWS enforces 
the MBTA, and promulgates rules and regulations that are 
compatible with the conventions.68  
The FWS has a great deal of discretion in deciding who to 
prosecute, and how, for violations of the MBTA.69 The agency 
“relies on the discretion of its in-house law enforcement staff to 
select which MBTA violations to pursue.”70 The MBTA has no 
private right of action, which is “what gives the selective 
enforcement rule its value: if the [FWS] does not enforce then 
there be no enforcement of the MBTA.”71 As the harm to birds 
becomes more indirect, and thus the culprit more difficult to 
ascertain, this discretion over enforcement has grown.72 
                                                                                                     
 66. See id. at 192 (describing a case in which a landowner was found guilty 
of killing Great Horned Owls that were killing his chickens: “Because the owl 
was on the official list, the court refused to consider the claim that the owls were 
year-round residents of the region and didn’t actually migrate . . .”). 
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); see also WILLIAM F. SIGLER, WILDLIFE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 54–56 (3d ed. 1980) (detailing the mechanics of the MBTA and 
explaining that the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to administrate the 
Act). 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 704. 
 69. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 32 (“The FWS has considerable discretion 
in deciding whom and when to prosecute for a violation of the MBTA.”). See 
generally Kathy G. Beckett, Migratory Bird Treaty Act Enforcement Questioned, 
NAT’L L.R. (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/migratory-
bird-treaty-act-enforcement-questioned (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 70. Chris Clarke, Expert: There’s a Problem with Fish and Wildlife’s 
Enforcement of Bird Law, KCET (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.kcet.org/redefine 
/expert-theres-a-problem-with-fish-and-wildlifes-enforcement-of-bird-law (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act and Other Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of its 
Own, the Environmental Protection Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 78 (2007). 
 72. See id. (“When hunters were the biggest immediate threat to birds, 
enforcement of the MBTA was more straightforward: you cite the hunter. With 
more of the harm to birds being done inadvertently, enforcement gets more 
complex . . . .”); Ogden, supra note 10, at 29 (discussing the FWS’s use of 
prosecutorial discretion to enforce the MBTA, and asserting that “prosecutorial 
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Commentators are wary of the FWS’s broad prosecutorial 
discretion, with many arguing that it is being exercised 
unevenly73 and that it is the most significant problem with the 
MBTA today.74 
2. The Problem with Taking 
The word “taking” plays a significant role in the enforcement 
of the MBTA.75 According to the MBTA, it is “unlawful at any 
time, by any means or in any manner, to . . . take . . . any 
migratory bird.”76 It is not clear, however, what “taking” entails, 
and “amendments to the MBTA have yet to expressly clarify 
which acts the MBTA criminalizes.”77 Unlike the other MBTA-
prohibited actions, such as hunting or trapping, the word take is 
open to interpretation.78 Some argue that taking occurs only in 
relation to intentional acts,79 while others argue that the MBTA’s 
                                                                                                     
discretion is the primary incentive” for parties and corporations to cooperate 
with FWS regulations). 
 73. See Brian Palmer, Angry Birds, NAT’L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (June 
12, 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/angry-birds (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) 
(“Last year the House Natural Resources Committee accused the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service of selectively targeting oil and gas companies and demanded 
that the agency supply records for every prosecution under the law. . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 41–40 (“[T]he FWS’s current MBTA 
enforcement policy that relies principally on prosecutorial discretion is 
indefensible and unsustainable.”). 
 75. See Alexander Obrecht, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Question of 
Un-Intentional Take Primed for Potential Fifth Circuit en Banc or Supreme 
Court Review, BAKER HOSTETLER (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.bakerenergy 
blog.com/2015/09/30/migratory-bird-treaty-act-question-of-unintentional-take-
primed-for-potential-fifth-circuit-en-banc-or-supreme-court-review/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2017) (explaining that the term take is often used in indictments 
against companies for MBTA violations) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 76. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012). 
 77. Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32. 
 78. See Means, supra note 12, at 826–28 (applying the rules of statutory 
construction to determine what actions are prohibited by the word “take” in the 
MBTA); Moreland, supra note 14 (describing the various interpretations of the 
word “take” and asserting that the term is ambiguous). 
 79. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“The MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only prohibits intentional acts (not 
omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.”); 
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ban on the taking of migratory birds applies to non-intentional 
actions as well.80 Additionally, this distinction is critical because 
the modern threats to birds are not hunting and trapping because 
the MBTA was wildly successful in stopping those dangers. Today 
the threats to birds are otherwise lawful activities that 
unintentionally kill migratory birds, which is known as incidental 
taking.81 
C. Modern Threats and Modern Industry 
The MBTA was devised to combat the overhunting that 
decimated bird populations in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.82 What the drafters could not have foreseen, however, 
are the threats currently facing the migratory bird populations. 
                                                                                                     
Moreland, supra note 14 (“The Fifth Circuit’s application of imaginative 
reconstruction, to explain that the 1918 Congress likely meant the traditional 
common law meaning of the word “take,” reinforces its holding that Congress 
did not extend the MBTA to include incidental bird deaths.”); see also Means, 
supra note 12, at 826 (“Statutory interpretation begins with the language of a 
statute and the plain language of the MBTA indicates that Congress meant only 
to regulate activity directed at wildlife.”). 
 80. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (1978) (reasoning 
that a person who dumps chemicals should be held strictly liable for any bird 
deaths, even if there was no intent to harm birds); Dickie, supra note 10 
(“Recent rulings in the 2nd and 10th circuits have taken the view that the law’s 
prohibition on “take” applies to any activity that is likely to kill migratory 
birds.”). 
 81. See Thomas Dimond, Fifth Circuit Limits the Scope of “Take” 
Prohibition Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Rejecting Second and 
Tenth’s Interpretation, ICEMILLER LEGAL COUNS. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.ice 
miller.com/ice-on-fire-insights/publications/fifth-circuit-limits-the-scope-of-the-
take-prohibi/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (“As the Fifth Circuit observed, properly 
limiting the scope of liability under the MBTA is of significant concern to any 
commercial enterprise.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Ogden, supra note 10, at 6–7 (“Today, all species of birds are far more likely to 
be killed by anthropogenic threats than the estimated fifteen million birds taken 
annually by hunters.”); see also Rozan, Detailed Discussion, supra note 32 
(“There is no question that the need for the protection of migratory birds has not 
abated in the last 100 years. But, it is clear that the nature of the threat has 
drastically changed.”). 
 82. See Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (“The MBTA was designed to forestall hunting of migratory birds and the 
sale of their parts. The court declines Mahler's invitation to extend the statute 
well beyond its language and the Congressional purpose behind its 
enactment.”). See generally supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text. 
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According to the FWS, outside of habitat destruction, the leading 
causes of bird mortality are collisions with building windows 
(estimated 7 million to 600 million bird deaths per year), 
communications towers (6.5 million), high tension transmission 
and power lines (8–57 million), electrocutions (900 thousand to 
11.6 million), impacts with vehicles (89–340 million), poisoning 
(72 million), and wind turbine rotors (140–500 thousand), as well 
as death in the hands (paws) of free-ranging domestic or feral 
cats (1.4 million–3.7 billion).83 Additionally, “oil field production 
‘skim pits’ and wastewater disposal facilities kill 500,000 birds 
annually,”84 and large solar panel farms may be responsible for 
up to 28,000 deaths annually.85 The difficulty of estimating 
mortality rates explains the great ranges in estimates, however, 
the FWS has synthesized the most recent studies to provide the 
best estimates of avian mortality.86 
                                                                                                     
 83. Threats to Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May 26, 2016), 
https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Scott 
R. Loss et al., The Impact of Free-Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife in the 
United States, NATURE COMM. Jan. 29, 2013, at 1–8 (presenting results of a 
study that found birds are more likely to be killed by free-ranging cats than any 
other cause). 
 84. Ogden, supra note 10, at 7. 
 85. See Eric Zerkel, New Solar Power Plants are Incinerating Birds, THE 
WEATHER CHANNEL (Aug. 18, 2014), https://weather.com/science/news/solar-
plants-birds-20140818 (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (reporting on deaths caused by 
birds flying across large solar panel firms and being “fried” mid-flight) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also John Upton, Solar Farms 
Threaten Birds, SCI. AM. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican. 
com/article/solar-farms-threaten-birds/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) (providing 
statistics and details of how solar panel farms threaten birds protected by the 
MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Vespa, After 
Frying Thousands of Birds, World’s Largest Solar Farm Catches Fire, 
TOWNHALL (May 21, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://townhall. 
com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2016/05/21/icymi-after-frying-thousands-of-birds-worlds-
largest-solar-farm-catches-fire-n2166718 (last visited on Oct. 12, 2016) 
(reporting on the harmful effects of the Ivanpah solar farm on migratory birds) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. See Threats to Birds, supra note 83 (providing statistics on the 
anthropomorphic threats to migratory birds). For the studies relied upon by the 
Fish and Wildlife Service in compiling these statistics, see generally U.S. DEP’T 
TRANSP., EVALUATION OF NEW OBSTRUCTION LIGHTING TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE 
AVIAN FATALITIES (2012), https://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/pdf/ management/ 
patterson2012.pdf; J. F Dwyer et al., Predictive Model of Avian Electrocution 
Risk on Overhead Powerlines, 28 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 159 (2013); Daniel 
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Modern industry clearly has a large impact on migratory 
birds, and not surprisingly, the MBTA has an equally large 
impact on modern industry. Energy companies are frequently 
defendants in MBTA cases.87 Enforcement actions have been 
taken against oil and gas producers,88 electric utilities, 89 and 
wind energy producers.90 State and local transportation agencies 
                                                                                                     
Klem, Jr. et al., Architectural and Landscape Risks Factors Associated with 
Bird-glass Collisions in an Urban Environment, 121 WILSON J. ORNITHOLOGY 
126 (2009); Scott R. Loss et al., Bird-building Collision in the United States: 
Estimates of Annual Mortality and Species Vulnerability, 116 THE CONDOR: 
ORNITHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 8 (2014); Scott R. Loss et al., Estimation of Bird-
Vehicle Collision Mortality on U.S. Roads, 78 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 763 (2014); 
Scott R. Loss, Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind Facilities in the 
Contiguous United States, 168 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 201 (2013); Travis 
Longcore et al., An Estimate of Avian Mortality at Communication Towers in the 
United States and Canada, PLOS ONE (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0034025 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Scott 
R. Loss et al., Refining Estimates of Bird Collision and Electrocution Mortality 
at Power Lines in the United States, PLOS ONE (July 3, 2014), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone. 0101565 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See Rozan, Detailed Description, supra note 32 (describing typical 
plaintiffs and defendants in MBTA cases). 
 88. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 
(D.N. Dak. 2012) (finding that and oil and gas producer’s use of reserve pits did 
not violate the MBTA because the deaths were unintentional); see also Brian K. 
Knox & Barry M. Hartman, New Criminal Charges Under Migratory Bird 
Treaty Create More Complexity for Energy Companies, K&L GATES (Sept. 8, 
2011), http://www.klgates.com/new-criminal-charges-under-migratory-bird-
treaty-act-09-07-2011/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (reporting that “[t]he United 
States Department of Justice recently filed federal criminal charges against 
seven oil and gas producers operating in North Dakota’s Williston Basin” for 
violations of the MBTA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding an electrical cooperative liable for killing 
birds that were making contact with its electrical poles). 
 90. See Utility Company Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing Protected Birds 
at Wind Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/utility-company-sentenced-wyoming-killing-protected- 
birds-wind-projects (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (detailing the charges against 
Duke Energy Renewables Inc. for killing migratory birds in Wyoming) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John Kell, Duke Energy Pays $1 
Million Fine for Killing Birds, WALL ST. J.  (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023047917045792145319441567 
44 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (reporting that Duke Energy Renewables Inc. pled 
guilty for killing golden eagles and other migratory birds at two of the 
company’s wind projects in Wyoming) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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are also susceptible to delays and increased costs associated with 
MBTA compliance.91 
Despite this, it is not clear how far the MBTA extends over 
these industries and activities. As discussed, the word taking is 
ambiguous, and these activities all involve incidental take, which 
may or may not be covered by the MBTA.92 As modern industry 
has developed, concern with the question of the MBTA’s authority 
over incidental take has also developed.93 It is in this context that 
the circuit courts of the United States have split in their 
interpretations of the Act, perhaps muddling the issue further. 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 91. See Oklahoma Department of Transportation, Comments from 
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (July 27, 2015), https://www. 
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0099& 
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“Compliance with [MBTA] in avoiding 
all possible impacts to the common cliff and barn swallows annually costs 
taxpayers of Oklahoma up to $15,000,000. Due to Oklahoma’s continued focus 
on addressing structurally deficient bridges, future costs attributable to 
compliance measures are projected to be as high as $21,500,000 in 2018.”); 
Oregon Department of Transportation, Re: Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067 
(July 27, 2015) 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0121&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“Oregon’s roadsides 
bridges and culverts are home to many nesting birds . . . .”); Tiny Hummingbird 
Egg Stalls Project to Upgrade a Bay Area Bridge, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-hummingbird-bridge-20170131-
story.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (reporting about a delay caused to a $92 
million bridge repair because of a MBTA-protected hummingbird egg found on 
bridge when the work was set to begin) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 92. Supra Part II, subpart D, section 2 and accompanying notes. 
 93. See Alexander K. Obrecht, Migrating Toward and Incidental Take 
Permit Program: Overhauling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Comport with 
Modern Industrial Operations, 54 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 107, 108–09 (2014) 
(speaking about the expansion of the MBTA through FWS enforcement and the 
ensuing confusion over their authority to prosecute incidental take under the 
MBTA). 
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III. Current Legal Landscape 
A. Judicial Interpretations 
Given its breadth, it is not surprising that the MBTA has 
been called the “most-violated law in the United States.”94 
Indeed, applying its provisions literally could lead to absurd 
results—such as criminal penalties being imposed on 
homeowners when a bird collides with their window.95 “The 
MBTA would impose criminal liability on a person for the death 
of a bird under circumstances where no criminal liability would 
be imposed for even the death of another person.”96 Recognizing 
the potential for such absurdity, some circuit courts have been 
reluctant to extend the reach of the MBTA to incidental 
activities.97 Others, however, have interpreted the MBTA to 
include incidental take, relying on the MBTA’s take provision to 
hold defendant’s criminally liable.98 This circuit court split is 
immediately relevant today, as both the FWS and businesses look 
                                                                                                     
 94. Chris Clarke, Nation’s Landmark Bird Protection Law Likely to See 
Major Changes, KCET (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.kcet.org/redefine/nations-
landmark-bird-protection-law-likely-to-see-major-changes (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 95. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (1978) (“Certainly 
construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths 
caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture 
windows in residential buildings into which birds fly, would offend reason and 
common sense.”); Andrew W. Minikowski, A Vision or a Waking Dream: 
Revising the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Empower Citizens and Address 
Modern Threats to Avian Populations, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 152, 154 (2014) (“Some 
courts feared that criminal liability under MBTA could reach the point of 
absurdity by holding parties liable for bird deaths that were truly beyond their 
control.”); Dickie, supra note 10 (“If it applies to human activity regardless of 
intent, then where do you draw the line?”). 
 96. Means, supra note 12, at 832 (quoting Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 
F. Supp. 1559, 1578 (S. D. Ind. 1996)). 
 97. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 154 (“[A]s the scope of criminal 
liability under MBTA began to increase, so did many of the federal courts’ 
unease with it.”); Obrecht, supra note 93, at 119–20 (“A recent body of case law, 
however, limits the MBTA’s misdemeanor provisions to intentional actions 
directed at birds.”). 
 98. See Minikowski, supra note 95, at 154 (discussing the history of the 
circuit split and the early decisions which relied on the take provision to expand 
the scope of the MBTA). 
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to the decisions of the courts to understand the meaning of the 
MBTA. 
1. Circuits that Have Extended the Reach of the MTBA 
The first judicial expansion of the MBTA came in 1978, when 
the Second Circuit held FMC Corporation (FMC) liable for bird 
deaths that occurred due to exposure to toxic chemicals.99 FMC, a 
pesticide and chemical company, was storing wastewater in a ten 
acre pond, which was attractive to migrating waterfowl.100 These 
birds began showing up dead, and the state and federal fish and 
wildlife services began an investigation.101 Although the water 
was treated prior to entering the pond, large concentrations of a 
harmful chemical, which could cause “a significant probability of 
death” to birds, was found in the pond. Once the investigation 
was complete, FMC discovered that the process being used to 
treat the chemical was ineffective—the chemical was being 
directly pumped into the pond.102 FMC was indicted on thirty-six 
counts for “unlawfully by means of toxic and noxious waters 
kill[ing] migratory birds included in the terms of the conventions 
between [the United States and Great Britain, Mexico and 
Japan], all in violation of Title 16, United States code, section 
703.”103 The jury convicted FMC on eighteen counts, and fined the 
company $100 per count, although the fine was remitted on all 
but five counts.104 
On appeal, FMC argued that “even if ‘the killing of migratory 
birds need not be accompanied by knowledgeable violation of the 
law’ (as in the hunter cases), there must be ‘an intent to harm 
                                                                                                     
 99. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 100. Id. at 904–05. 
 101. Id. at 905. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 903. 
 104. Id. The circuit judges reviewing the decision of the trial court were 
apparently “baffled” as to why the jury chose to convict on some, but not all of 
the counts. Judge Moore wrote “The 18 counts selected by the jury for conviction 
covering the alleged killings . . . and the 18 counts for acquittal . . . present no 
clue useful on appellate review unless there were jurors disposed favorably to 
the Ringbilled Gull and Shortbilled Dowicher . . . and less favorably to the Least 
Sandpiper and the Migratory Fringillid . . . .”). Id. 
CLIPPING THE WINGS OF INDUSTRY 301 
birds culminating in their death’ for a conviction.”105 The court 
rejected this argument: “[H]ere the statute does not include as an 
element of the offense ‘wilfully, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently.’”106 The court found that FMC had “engaged in the 
manufacture of a pesticide known to be highly toxic” and then 
failed to take measures to prevent this chemical from reaching a 
pond where it could come into contact with birds and other 
animals, which was enough to impose strict liability on the 
company.107 
In its analysis, the Second Circuit relied on “the rule of 
reason” and an analogy to tort law. In the court’s words; “where 
there is no help to be had from legislative history or decisional 
authority, as in this specific situation, resort must be had to a 
rule of reason or even better, common sense.”108 This guiding 
“common sense” principle led the court to reason that extending 
the scope of the MBTA to cover every unintentional killing of 
birds would not be problematic because “such situations can be 
left to the sound discretion of the prosecutors and the courts.”109 
The FMC court also analogized the factual scenario to a 
principle of tort law to find the corporation liable. Explaining that 
the company failed to prevent the toxin from entering the pond, 
the court wrote; “Such a situation is analogous to the situations 
in the various tort notions of strict liability which have 
insinuated themselves into American Law since the English case 
of Rylands v. Fletcher.”110 In Rylands v. Fletcher, the English 
court found that a person would be prima facie answerable for 
damage caused by anything “likely to do mischief” that that 
person brought onto their land.111 The court then noted that the 
notion of strict liability “has been deemed to apply” in this type of 
case (in tort law) and also “when a person engages in 
extrahazardous activites.”112 The court reasoned that FMC had 
                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 906 (quoting Appellant’s brief at 11). 
 106. Id. at 908. 
 107. Id. at 907. 
 108. Id. at 905. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
 111. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing 
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330). 
 112. Id. 
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engaged in the manufacturing of a highly toxic chemical, FMC 
failed to protect the chemical from escaping into the pond, where 
it then killed birds, and that “this is sufficient to impost strict 
liability on FMC.” The Second Circuit’s ruling thus appears to 
impose MBTA liability on incidental takings, although the court’s 
ruling may be subject to some interpretation.113  
The Tenth Circuit joined the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of the MBTA in 2010 when it “firmly established strict liability 
under the MBTA, even for unintentional killings.”114 In United 
States. V. Apollo Energies, Inc. (Apollo),115 the Tenth Circuit 
reviewed the convictions of two oil drilling operators, Apollo 
Energies and Dale Walker, who were charged with violating the 
MBTA after dead migratory birds were “discovered lodged in a 
piece of their oil drilling equipment called a heater-treater.”116 
FWS became involved after acting on an anonymous tip and 
finding ten protected birds lodged in the heater-treaters.117 FWS 
did not immediately pursue action against the drilling 
operators.118 Instead, FWS “embarked on a public education 
campaign to alert oil producers to the heater-treater problem,” 
and gave the oil producers a “grace period” of time to correct the 
problem.119 Apollo was one of the oil producers notified directly by 
FWS about the problem, but there was no evidence that Walker 
was notified.120 When FWS inspected the heater-treaters again 
following the grace period, dead migratory birds were found in 
both Apollo’s and Walker’s systems.121 Apollo was convicted of one 
violation of the MBTA, and Walker was convicted of two 
violations.122 
On appeal, Apollo and Walker made several arguments. 
First, they argued that the MBTA is not a strict liability statute, 
and that they lacked the necessary mental state to commit a 
                                                                                                     
 113. Infra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
 114. Obrecht, supra note 93, at 126. 
 115. 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 116. Id. at 682. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 682–83. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 683. 
 122. Id. 
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violation.123 Second, they argued that the MBTA is 
unconstitutionally vague.124 Lastly, Apollo and Walker argued 
that due process requires that they directly cause the bird deaths 
in order to be found guilty.125 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the appellants’ argument that the 
MBTA is not a strict liability statute; “As a matter of statutory 
construction, the ‘take’ provision of the Act does not contain a 
scienter requirement.”126 In the eyes of the court, the MBTA is 
not vague, and does not encourage the arbitrary enforcement of 
its provision.127 “The actions criminalized by the MBTA may be 
legion, but they are not vague.”128 The court also held that a 
“strict liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct 
charged here satisfies due process concerns only if defendants 
proximately caused harm to protected birds,” and that “due 
process requires criminal defendants have adequate notice that 
their conduct is in violation of the Act.”129  
In the opinion, the Tenth Circuit relied on the notion of 
proximate cause to cabin the possible absurd results that could 
occur by applying strict liability to even incidental take, and the 
potential resulting due process concerns.130 The court noted that 
[c]entral to all of the Supreme Court’s cases on the due process 
constraints on criminal statutes is foreseeability—whether it 
is framed as a constitutional constraint on causation and 
mental state, or whether it is framed as a presumption in 
statutory construction. When the MBTA is stretched to 
criminalize predicate acts that could not have been reasonably 
foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the statute 
reaches its constitutional breaking point.131 
The court ultimately upheld the conviction of Apollo, who had 
known of the dangers of the heater-treaters to birds, but failed to 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 686. 
 127. Id. at 688–89. 
 128. Id. at 689. 
 129. Id. at 682. 
 130. Id. at 689–90. 
 131. Id. at 690 (citations omitted). 
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take any steps to mitigate the dangers.132 Walker’s conviction was 
overturned however, as there was no evidence that he knew of 
the danger the heater-treaters posed to migratory birds.133 The 
Tenth Circuit was clear, however, that even without the intent, 
industrial activity that kills a migratory bird violates the 
MBTA.134 
2. Circuits that Have Declined to Extend the Reach of the MBTA 
Currently, the Eighth, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits have refused 
to extend MBTA liability to incidental take. The first of these 
decisions is Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans (Seattle Audubon)135, 
a Ninth Circuit case from 1991. In Seattle Audubon, the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed an appeal from an injunction enjoining timber 
sales in spotted owl habitats in national forests in Oregon, 
Washington, and Northern California.136 The plaintiffs, an 
environmental group, argued that “timber sales which destroy 
owl habitat are tantamount to a proscribed ‘taking’ under the 
Act.”137 The court did not agree: “Habitat destruction causes 
‘harm’ under the [Endangered Species Act] but does not ‘take’ 
them within the meaning of the MBTA.”138 
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on a 
classic tool of statutory construction by comparing the text of the 
MBTA with the text of the Endangered Species Act; 
Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the MBTA, 
“take” is defined as to “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect,” or to attempt any such act . . . . Under the 
Endangered Species Act enacted in 1973, in contrast, the word 
“take” is defined in a broader way to include “harass,” and 
“harm,” in addition to the verbs included in the MBTA 
definition. The broadest term, “harm,” which is not included in 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 691. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. (discussing the equipment used by oil operators which are 
known to kill birds, and finding the deaths of the birds caused by the 
heater-treaters violated the MBTA). 
 135. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 136. Id. at 298. 
 137. Id. at 302. 
 138. Id. at 303. 
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the regulations under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, is 
defined by ESA Regulation to include habitat modification or 
degradation . . . . We agree with the Seattle district court that 
the differences in the proscribed conduct under ESA and the 
MBTA are “distinct and purposeful.” The ESA was enacted in 
1973. Congress amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act the 
following year, but did not modify its prohibitions to include 
“harm.”139 
The Ninth Circuit also found that the legislative history of 
the statute did not support an expanded reading of the MBTA, 
and thus declined to extend the reach of the MBTA to cover 
actions that only indirectly lead to bird deaths.140 
Not long after Seattle Audubon, the Eighth Circuit came to 
the same conclusion in a factually similar case that also involved 
a logging operation. In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. 
Forest Serv. (Newton),141 the Eighth Circuit “considered whether 
the Forest Service’s final action approving timber sales, which 
was subject to review under the National Forest Management 
Act, was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law because the 
agency ignored or violated its obligations under the MBTA.”142 
The Wildlife Association argued that because the logging under 
the timber sale would disrupt nesting birds, killing some (a fact 
that the Forest Service did not contest), the sales would violate 
the taking provision of the MBTA unless the FWS obtained a 
permit.143  
The court did not accept this argument. Looking to the 
historical context of the MBTA, the court concluded that “[s]trict 
liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and 
poachers. But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the 
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal 
prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 302–03. 
 140. Id. at 303. 
 141. 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 142. Ogden, supra note 10, at 20. 
 143. Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 
(8th Cir. 1997). The Court also found that the MBTA does not apply to federal 
agencies. Id. at 115. This is another contested issue in MBTA enforcement, for 
more see generally Robb Wolfson, Note, Birds at a Crossroads: Strategies for 
Augmenting the MBTA’s Sway Over Federal Lands, 21 VA ENVTL. L.J. 535 
(2003). 
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results in the death of migratory birds.” 144 The court agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit, and ruled that “the ambiguous terms ‘take’ and 
‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort 
engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was 
undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s 
enactment . . . .’”145 
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that the scope of 
the MBTA does not encompass incidental take. In United States 
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. (Citgo),146 the Fifth Circuit reviewed 
Citgo’s conviction under the MBTA for taking migratory birds. 
Citgo was convicted for the deaths of migratory birds that had 
been caused by open-air oil tanks.147 The district court surveyed 
many MBTA cases and “adopted the Tenth Circuit's position and 
held it ‘obvious’ that ‘unprotected oil field equipment can take or 
kill migratory birds.’”148 
The Fifth Circuit was not swayed by the district court’s 
interpretation of the statute; “We decline to adopt the broad, 
counter-textual reading of the MBTA by these circuits.” To reach 
this conclusion, the court looked at the historical context of the 
MBTA,149 its common law origin,150 its text,151 and a comparison 
with other relevant statutes.152 These canons of statutory 
construction convinced the court that the word “take” maintained 
its common law meaning in the MBTA: “As applied to wildlife, to 
                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 115 (citations omitted). 
 145. Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
 146. 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 147. Id. at 481–82. 
 148. Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 
2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012)). 
 149. See id. at 488 (describing the history of the MBTA and its foundational 
treaties). 
 150. See id. at 489–90 (examining the common law definition of the term 
“take” and asserting that there is no evidence that Congress meant to deviate 
from that definition). 
 151. See id. at 490–91 (detailing the textual structure of the MBTA and 
concluding that nothing in the text points to an expanded meaning of the word 
“take” outside of the common law definition). 
 152. See id. at 489–91 (comparing the text of the MBTA, the Endangered 
Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act and finding the differences 
between the statutes “distinct and purposeful”) (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y 
v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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‘take’ is to ‘reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to 
human control.’”153  
The Fifth Circuit also directly confronted the Second and 
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in its decision: 
Courts that have read the MBTA broadly, mainly the Second 
and Tenth Circuits, disagree with our ultimate conclusion, but 
not our analysis of the MBTA’s text. Instead, these courts hold 
that because the MBTA imposes strict liability, it must forbid 
acts that accidentally or indirectly kill birds . . . . These and 
like decisions confuse the mens rea and the actus reus 
requirements. Strict liability crimes dispense with the first 
requirement; the government need not prove the defendant 
had any criminal intent. But a defendant must still commit 
the act to be liable. Further, criminal law requires that the 
defendant commit the act voluntarily.154 
Needless to say, Citgo’s conviction was overturned.155 The 
Fifth Circuit explicitly refused to extend the scope of the MBTA 
to incidental take.156  
B. The District Courts 
The federal district courts are also divided on the question of 
the scope of the MBTA, further complicating the issue. The 
district court for the District of Colorado found that the MBTA 
applies to incidental take, following the precedent set by 
Apollo.157 The Eastern District of California, which is part of the 
Ninth Circuit has also found that the MBTA can be 
constitutionally applied to impose criminal penalties on those 
who did not intend to kill birds.158 This would seem to be 
incongruous with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Seattle Audubon, 
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 489. 
 154. Id. at 491–92. 
 155. Id. at 494. 
 156. See id. (“Differing with the district court’s conclusions, we hold 
that . . . the MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only prohibits intentional acts (not 
omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory birds.”) 
 157. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1074) (“[W]hether Moon lake intended to cause the deaths of 17 protected 
birds is irrelevant to its prosecution under [the MBTA].”). 
 158. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. 
Cal. 1978) (discussing the lack of a scienter or intent requirement in the MBTA). 
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but the Ninth Circuit distinguished the two factually, as one 
concerned poisoning and the other habitat destruction.159 
Other district courts that have ruled on the issue, however, 
have found that the MBTA does not extend to incidental take. 
These include the District of New Mexico,160 the Western District 
of Louisiana,161 the Western District of Pennsylvania,162 the 
Southern District of Indiana,163 the District of North Dakota,164 
and the District of Oregon.165 The MBTA has even been found to 
be unconstitutionally vague,166 despite Apollo’s assertion that the 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“In Corbin Farm Serv., the district court simply held that the MBTA can 
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‘taking’ . . . .”) (citing United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 
(E.D. Cal. 1978)). 
 160. See United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR-05-1516-MV, 
2009 WL 8691615, at *7 (D.N.M. 2009) (“The Court concludes that Congress 
intended to prohibit only conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to 
criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not directed at birds, but which 
incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths.”). 
 161. See United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., Criminal No. 09-CR-0132, 
2009 WL 3645170, at *3 (W.D. La. 2009) (“These regulations were clearly not 
intended to apply to commercial ventures where, occasionally, protected species 
might be incidentally killed as a result of totally legal and permissible activities, 
as happened here.”). 
 162. See Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(“As noted in numerous cases, the loss of migratory birds as a result of timber 
sales of the type at issue in this case do not constitute a ‘taking’ or ‘killing’ 
within the meaning of the MBTA.”). 
 163. See Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1583 (S.D. Ind. 
1996) (finding that the prohibitions of the MBTA only apply to activities that 
are intended to kill or capture birds or to traffic in their parts). 
 164. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 
(D.N. Dak. 2012) (“This Court expressly finds that the use of reserve pits in 
commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity that stands 
outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”). 
 165. See Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc., v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 
1502, 1510 (D. Or. 1991) (“Plaintiffs attempt to expand the MBTA's definition of 
a ‘taking’ by reference to the ESA definition of a ‘taking’ . . . . Identical attempts 
to expand the definition of a “taking” under the MBTA to include Forest Service 
activity have been rejected by at least two other district courts.”). 
 166. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Idaho 1989) 
(reversing the conviction under the MBTA of a farmer that used pesticides on an 
alfalfa crop which were then ingested by migratory birds, killing them, because 
the Act was unconstitutionally vague when applied to the facts of the case). 
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Act’s terms “are capable of definition” that “ordinary people can 
understand.”167 
C. Making Sense of the Judicial Landscape 
So, what can be gleaned from the varying interpretations of 
the MBTA at both the circuit and district court levels? 
Unfortunately, the only take away from the decisions is that 
there is no well-defined law regarding whether the MBTA applies 
to incidental take. Each of the decisions discussed above has been 
criticized, applauded, and distinguished, making the law even 
more unclear. 
While the Second Circuit found FMC liable for the incidental 
take of birds, the decision has been criticized for applying tort 
principles inappropriately in a criminal prosecution and for being 
driven by policy, not by law.168 Additionally, some commentators 
have asserted that FMC’s holding applies in only the narrow 
factual circumstances of FMC where ultra-hazardous materials 
were responsible for the deaths,169 while others have read the 
opinion to apply in a broader array of factual scenarios.170  
                                                                                                     
 167. United States v. Apollo Industries, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 688 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
 168. See Obrecht, supra note 93, at 123 (“Ultimately, commentators and 
other courts criticized the Second Circuit’s application of criminal strict liability 
based on tort principles.”). 
 169. See Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict Criminal 
Liability for Non-Hunting, Human Caused Bird Deaths, 77 DEN. L. REV. 315, 
333 (1999) (observing that the Second Circuit relied on the ultra-hazardous 
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adequately explain why the MBTA should include incidental takings . . . . While 
the court explained why the MBTA should include incidental deaths to promote 
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includes incidental deaths.”). 
 170. See Obrecht, supra note 93, at 123 (“FMC Corp. laid the groundwork as 
the first major circuit court decision upholding strict liability for industrial 
activities under the MBTA.”). 
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Apollo has been heavily criticized for “inserting a mens rea 
requirement into a strict liability crime.”171 This judicial 
innovation was condemned as the nail in the coffin for strict 
liability under the MBTA; “If the MBTA is to maintain its strict 
liability standard . . . the reasoning of Apollo Energies simply 
cannot be accepted. Its current status as the latest and nearly 
exclusive appellate position on the issue renders it particularly 
dangerous.”172 Despite these criticisms, “[t]he Apollo Energies 
court’s use of notice as a standard for determining what 
consequences are reasonably foreseeable has been incorporated in 
guidelines for federal prosecution.”173  
Criticism has also been levied against the decisions that have 
taken a narrow view of the MBTA. Some commentators believe 
that the outcomes of Seattle Audubon and Newton are part of an 
outdated and “untenable” viewpoint on environmental law,174 
while others, including other federal courts, have taken issue 
with the distinction the Ninth and Eighth Circuit courts drew 
between “direct” and “indirect” action.175 Others interpreted the 
holdings of Seattle Audubon and Newton as narrowly focused and 
applicable only to circumstances involving habitat 
modification.176 
Ultimately, the major problems with the case law speaking to 
the scope of the MBTA is that it is unclear. Considering this 
judicial landscape, how can businesses and industries predict the 
legality of their actions when they may conflict with the MBTA, 
especially those businesses that may be operating in multiple 
jurisdictions? 
                                                                                                     
 171. Ogden, supra note 10, at 21. 
 172. Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict 
Liability under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 604 (2012). 
 173. Ogden, supra note 10, at 19. 
 174. Id. at 27. 
 175. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d. 1070, 1076 
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D. How Can Businesses Cope? 
The short answer is that they can’t. It is not clear what the 
law is on the MBTA, what is covered by the Act, and how it is 
enforced.177 These are significant problems for businesses that 
may incur some incidental take. 
For established businesses, the uncertainty around the law 
can be costly. For example, the MBTA’s misdemeanor penalties 
subject “any person, association, or other business entity to a fine 
of not more the $15,000, imprisonment not to exceed six months, 
or both.”178 In some jurisdictions, the Department of Justice may 
impose this fine for each violation, which, in the case of large 
industrial operations, can add up a substantial industry-affecting 
fine.179 For example, in 2009, Pacificorp, an electric utility, 
pleaded guilty to thirty-four misdemeanor violations of the 
MBTA.180 The plea cost the company $510,000 in criminal fines, 
$900,000 in restitution, and the company was ordered to spend 
$9.1 million to repair or replace its equipment to prevent further 
avian deaths.181 Although Pacificorp was not using best practices 
for mitigating these deaths,182 in another jurisdiction it is 
                                                                                                     
 177. See infra notes 195–212 (discussing the use of prosecutorial discretion 
to enforce the MBTA); supra notes 99–167 (discussing varying judicial 
interpretations of the MBTA). 
 178. Obrecht, supra note 93, at 119 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012)). 
 179. See id. (speaking about the authority of the Department of Justice to 
impose violations for each violation, or each individual bird killing). But see 
United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding 
that multiple bird deaths resulting from a single transaction cannot be 
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 180. Press Release: Utility Giant to Pay Millions for Eagle Protection, U.S. 
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 10, 2009), https://www.fws.gov/mountain-
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Washington and Lee Law Review). Pacificorp’s wind energy division has since 
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file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. (explaining that Pacificorp was charged for killing 232 eagles in 
about two years and for failing to use readily available measures to mitigate 
avian electrocutions at the site). 
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possible that in another jurisdiction the company would have 
only been liable for only one fine for the single occasion of bird 
deaths,183 or may not have been liable at all.184 
The cost of criminal prosecution under the MBTA can also be 
measured in damage to a company’s reputation. Enforcement 
actions against corporations, which violate the MBTA, are often 
widely publicized, but the average newsreader will likely not 
understand the intricacies of the legal landscape surrounding the 
MBTA. Thus, a corporation may find itself in a public relations 
nightmare, even if it followed best practices to avoid bird deaths: 
“Stigma may nonetheless endure based on factors beyond the 
corporation’s control, such as public perceptions of the 
wrongdoing and the extent to which corporate values are seen as 
the culprit.”185 This reputational harm can damaging and lasting 
effects on a corporation.186 
Uncertain liability also poses a significant problem for new 
industry. The legal ambiguity around the MBTA can be a major 
obstacle to developing and creating new infrastructure. This can 
be illustrated by looking at the effect of uncertainty on the 
development of a wind energy project: 
The development of a modern wind project costs tens of 
millions, and often hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, the 
source of funds and the willingness of banks or holders of 
capital to support a project are critical factors in the success of 
a modern wind project . . . . For large electrical generating 
projects, the limits on rate of return . . . require limited risk 
before funding will be released to allow construction. Thus, 
                                                                                                     
 183. Some jurisdictions do not allow separate charges for each dead bird, but 
rather allow only one charge for all of the bird deaths. See United States v. 
Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Meredith B. Lilley 
& Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A 
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Corporate Prosecution, 49 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1265 (2016). 
 186. See id. at 1264–66 (discussing the ways society reacts to corporate 
criminal prosecutions and condoning corporate prosecutions for their deterrent 
effect). 
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there is low tolerance for uncertainty in wind energy 
projects . . . . The uncertainty brought on by unknown avian 
impacts, unknown possible consequences to the ability of the 
project to operate, and unknown mitigation costs . . . can be an 
unbearable burden on project financing. Avian impacts thus 
present several distinct challenges to wind energy 
developers . . . for instance, pre-project permitting uncertainty 
and post-operation risk of reduced operation, shutdown, or 
fines for avian impacts.187  
For the wind energy industry, this problem is compounded by 
the fact that renewable energy is a priority for both the state and 
federal governments, which mandated development of this 
technology.188 Additionally, these problems are likely to increase 
because as the wind and solar energy industries develop, the 
number of birds killed by these projects will rise.189 It is likely 
that the problem of incidental take will hold back the 
development of these industries: “[W]hile [current legislation] 
promotes renewable energy . . . older laws, [such as the MBTA], 
with outdated value systems, have been left as barriers to 
renewable energy.”190 The long view is that this hindrance is 
counterproductive because the more significant harms of fossil 
fuels on migratory birds will be offset by ostensibly moving to 
renewable energy.191  
These “older laws” present barriers to the development of 
industries outside of the wind sector as well. For example, 
Congress has encouraged the development of wireless broadband 
                                                                                                     
 187. McKinsey, supra note 71, at 88–89. 
 188. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 9–10 (speaking about the commitment of 
the Obama administration, Congress, and the state governments to increasing 
wind energy generation and use of wind energy domestically). 
 189. See Scott R. Loss, Estimates of Bird Collision Mortality at Wind 
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 191. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent 
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renewable energy will offset the harmful impact of the fossil fuel industry). 
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connection.192 The uncertainty concerning liability under the 
MBTA creates significant delay in advancing this directive.193 
Energy companies are also hindered if they are required to make 
habitat modifications that may affect migratory birds. While 
logging does not constitute take, other actions by energy 
producers may require significant steps and delays to avoid 
prosecution by the FWS.194 
The challenges associated with uncertainty are compounded 
by the FWS’s wide discretion in enforcing (or not enforcing) the 
MBTA.195 As discussed, FWS has very broad discretion in 
enforcing the MBTA and largely uses this discretion to encourage 
mitigation and compliance with MBTA guidelines.196 While the 
Second Circuit was comfortable with prosecutorial discretion 
acting as a limitation on the application of the MBTA,197 other 
courts have not been uneasy with the range of discretion left to 
FWS.198  
The first problem with prosecutorial discretion is that it is 
unpredictable in multiple ways.199 “[E]nforcement policies might 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (1996) (“The 
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and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”). 
 193. See COMMENTS OF THE EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, QUADRENNIAL 
ENERGY REVIEW INFRASTRUCTURE SITING PUBLIC MEETING 3 (Aug. 21, 2104), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/08/f18/d_loughery_statement_qer_c
heyenne.pdf (“Inconsistent interpretations for implementing the Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act amongst and 
within federal agencies add to the difficulty in building new transmission and 
maintaining existing facilities.”). 
 194. See Howe, supra note 18 (“[A]lthough habitat modification is not 
expressly a ‘take’ under the MBTA, the FWS has utilized . . . its status as the 
MBTA implementing agency to seek to alter the footprint of a large energy 
infrastructure project in the environmental review process.”). 
 195. See McKinsey, supra note 71, at 78 (“The MBTA is mostly 
accommodated in the United States by being ignored . . . .’). 
 196. Supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 197. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 198. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 
1085 (D. Colo. 1999) (“[C]ourts should not rely on prosecutorial discretion to 
ensure that a statute does not ensnare those beyond its proper confines.”); 
Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (“Such 
trust in prosecutorial discretion is not really an answer to the issue of statutory 
construction.”). 
 199. See McKinsey, supra note 71, at 89 (“The uncertainty brought on by 
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vary from administration to administration in dramatic ways, 
making long-range planning much more difficult.”200 There is the 
constant problem of “over-enforcement” and “under-enforcement” 
of the Act, depending on the priorities of the current 
administration.201 A recent development highlights this problem. 
During its final two weeks, the Obama Administration issued a 
legal opinion finding that the MBTA prohibits incidental 
takings.202 This policy was in place for about a year before it was 
reversed by the Trump administration in late 2017.203 Businesses 
can not plan for the future when the law is constantly changing, 
as is currently the case. 
Second, prosecutorial discretion does not help businesses 
anticipate how their actions will be evaluated under the MBTA, 
and it does not answer the question of what the law actually is.204 
An interesting example of this is the history of enforcement 
against wind energy projects. The first criminal prosecution 
against a wind energy company came in 2013 against Duke 
Energy Renewables.205 For years prior to this prosecution, 
commentators speculated on whether wind energy projects would 
ever be prosecuted under the MBTA, with many believing they 
would not be.206 The prosecution was a surprise to the industry 
                                                                                                     
reliance on selective enforcement is perhaps the most difficult risk to precisely 
assess.”). 
 200. Means, supra note 12, at 835. 
 201. Ogden, supra note 10, at 40. 
 202. Birds of Regulatory Prey, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/birds-of-regulatory-prey-1514500651 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Means, supra note 12, at 836 (discussing the expansion of the 
MBTA through prosecutorial discretion and the problems that are caused by 
this method of enforcement). 
 205. Kell, supra note 90. The Duke Energy case exemplifies another aspect 
of MBTA enforcements, which is the lack of coordination between executive 
actors. Duke Energy was fined for killing golden eagles and pled guilty to the 
charge in November, 2013. Id. However, in December 2013, the Obama 
administration issued a notice that it would allow wind energy developers to kill 
bald and golden eagles without penalty, in an effort to spur wind development. 
See Wind Farms that Kill Bald Eagles Are Now Protected From Prosecution, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/wind-
farms-that-kill-bald-eagles-are-now-protected-from-prosecution/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 206. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 183, at 1186–90 (arguing that courts 
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and undoubtedly served as warning to others in the industry that 
they must take proactive steps to avoid avian take.207 The fact 
that the prosecution was such a surprise is telling however; lack 
of wind energy prosecutions became accepted as the norm, so 
wind energy projects planned accordingly, until the FWS 
abruptly changed its policies.208 
A third problem with prosecutorial discretion is it creates 
suspicion that the MBTA is being enforced selectively, which 
has the potential to undermine the willingness of industries to 
comply with FWS guidelines and efforts.209 This has been the 
concern of several members of congress in recent years,210 and 
may have a significant impact on the FWS’s credibility: 
                                                                                                     
will find that the MBTA does not reach wind energy takes). 
 207. See Arthur L. Haubenstock, Takeaways from the First MBTA Criminal 
Prosecution, LAW 360 (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/494437/takeaways-from-the-first-mbta-criminal-prosecution (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017) (“Renewable energy developers should take heed of the clear 
message presented by the guidelines and this recent settlement, and take 
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and avoid avian take.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 208. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 33 (describing the adverse affects of failing 
to prosecute wind energy projects for bird deaths, including the disincentive to 
comply with voluntary guidelines because of the lack of a fear of prosecution). 
Andrew Ogden argues that this type of policy-making may be a violation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. Ogden, supra note 10, at 38–40. 
 209. See id. at 37 (“[T]he lack of prosecutions of wind energy developers or 
operators creates a strong inference that prosecutorial discretion is being 
exercised unevenly to favor wind energy over other activities such as the oil and 
gas industry.”); Paul Kerlinger, Does the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Selectively Enforce Bird Laws?, N. AM. WIND POWER (May 2016), 
http://nawindpower.com/online/issues/NAW1605/FEAT_02_Does-The-U.S.-Fish-
And-Wildlife-Service-Selectively-Enforce-Bird-Laws.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2017) (“[T]he dollars and time spent by the FWS are not proportional to the 
damage to birds . . . . The fact that the FWS is spending disproportionately more 
time and money focusing on the wind industry strongly suggests that it is 
selectively regulating and enforcing the MBTA.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Ogden, supra note 10, at 40 (“The result of such inaction, 
allegations, ambiguity, and opacity undermines the FWS’s credibility, and 
possibility its legal authority, as the unbiased enforcer of the nation’s wildlife 
laws . . . .”). 
 210. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 37 
Republican Senators David Vitter and Lamar Alexander questioned 
the FWS’s motivations for prosecuting MBTA cases against oil and 
gas producers in a letter to the Attorney General. Senator, and then–
Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, requested that the 
House Judiciary Committee investigate how the Obama 
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Although these complaints may be more about politics than 
plovers, they do raise the valid question of what is the FWS’s 
policy that dictates when, where, and against whom will an 
enforcement action for an incidental taking under the MBTA 
be referred for prosecution? From its own statements, the FWS 
has an internal practice that a violator’s adherence to 
guidelines and implementation of FWS’s recommendations 
will result in a lower likelihood of prosecution. But, the lack of 
clear guidelines for many industrial activities, and the failure 
to bring enforcement actions against wind energy producers 
when FWS guidelines may have been violated, give the 
appearance that prosecutorial discretion is being applied 
unevenly and with the possible intention of favoring a specific 
industry.211 
This is a problem because as the pronounced law around the 
scope of the MBTA has become muddled through different 
interpretations by the courts, the main protection the birds have 
from incidental take is the willingness of companies and 
industries to work with FWS for best practices.212 If animosity is 
brought about through a perception of unequal enforcement, then 
industries will be less likely to work with the FWS. This 
dimension takes on a new significance given the FWS’s recent 
proposal to begin a rulemaking concerning incidental take. 
IV. The Proposed Rulemaking 
In light of the confusing judicial landscape surrounding the 
MBTA, and amid growing concern over how the FWS is enforcing 
the Act, FWS has issued a notice of intent to prepare an 
environmental impact statement to evaluate the “potential 
environmental impacts of a proposal to authorize incidental take 
of migratory birds” under the MBTA.213 This notice of intent is 
the first step in the administrative process for creating an agency 
                                                                                                     
administration chooses to enforce the MBTA, and then–Presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney brought up the subject of selective 
enforcement of the MBTA during the 2012 debates. 
 211. Id. at 37. 
 212. See id. at 33 (“[I]t is important to emphasize that compliance 
with . . . any advice or comments from the FWS regarding a particular project, is 
completely voluntary.”). 
 213. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
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rulemaking. The FWS is required under the National 
Environmental Policy Act to undertake an assessment of 
environmental effects of a proposed rulemaking prior to making a 
final decision.214 Once FWS has evaluated the environmental 
impact and reviewed the comments submitted in regards to the 
notice of intent, it will likely issue a notice of rulemaking, which 
will then be subject to an additional notice-and-comment 
period.215 Because the FWS action is in an early stage, it is not 
clear what form the proposed rule will take. However, what is 
apparent is that the possible rulemaking actions that are 
proposed in the notice of intent present a major question about 
the authority of the FWS to undertake this kind of rulemaking, 
and will not solve the current problems with the MBTA. 
A. Proposal 
The proposal lists several different possible rulemaking 
actions, and invites comments from interested parties, many of 
which have been submitted.216 The potential approaches to 
enforcement include individual permits, general permits for 
certain industries, and memoranda of understanding with federal 
agencies.217 
The first possible approach that FWS is considering is “to 
establish a general conditional authorization for incidental take 
by certain hazards to birds associated with particular industry 
sectors.”218 This would be subject to the condition that those 
sectors adhere to “appropriate” standards to mitigate their 
impact on migratory birds, including conservation methods and 
technologies that have been developed for this purpose.219 The 
hazards and sectors being considered are oil, gas, and wastewater 
                                                                                                     
 214. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1975). 
 215. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 216. For access to all of the comments submitted, see generally Docket 
Browser, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser? 
rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=FWS-HQ-MB-
2014-0067 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 217. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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disposal pits, gas burner pipes, communications towers, and 
electric transmission and distribution lines.220 The FWS selected 
these hazards and sectors because FWS has a history of working 
with those sectors— “they consistently take birds and [the FWS 
has] substantial knowledge about measures these industries can 
take to prevent or reduce incidental bird deaths.”221 
The second approach being considered by FWS is the 
issuance of “individual incidental take permits for projects or 
activities not covered under the described general, conditional 
authorization . . . [or] for which there is limited information 
regarding adverse effects.”222 Under this approach, the FWS 
would not issue any actual individual permits, but would 
establish the authority and standards for the issuance of permits, 
and will also consider ways to minimize the administrative 
burdens of obtaining other Federal individual incidental take 
permits.223 
The third option under consideration is “to establish a 
procedure for authorizing incidental take by Federal agencies 
that commit in a memorandum of understanding with [FWS] to 
consider impacts to migratory birds in their actions and to 
mitigate that take appropriately.”224 
The fourth possible approach would be the “development of 
voluntary guidance for industry sectors.”225 Under this approach, 
FWS “would continue to work closely with interested industry 
sectors to assess the extent that their their operations and 
facilities may pose hazards to migratory birds” and to evaluate 
mitigation guidelines.226 This approach would not provide legal 
authorization for incidental take but FWS would, as a matter of 
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 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. This proposed regulation is not pertinent for this article as it deals 
with federal agencies and not private parties. However, it is worth noting that 
there is a divide on whether the MBTA even applies to federal agencies, making 
this a problematic proposal in terms of FWS authority. See generally Robb 
Wolfson, Note, Birds at a Crossroads: Strategies for Augmenting the MBTA’s 
Sway Over Federal Lands, 21 VA ENVTL. L. J. 535 (2003). 
 225. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 226. Id. 
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discretion, “consider the extent to which a company or individual 
had complied with that guidance as a substantial factor in 
assessing any potential enforcement action for violation of the 
Act.”227 
B. The Proposed Rulemaking’s Shortcomings 
Assuming that the FWS ultimately finds the authority to 
regulate incidental taking, the proposed rules leave several 
problems unresolved that will undermine the purpose of the 
rulemaking.228 As discussed, the current problems with the 
MBTA and its myriad of interpretations are that the law is 
uncertain which leads to inconsistent (and possibly unequal) 
enforcement, it hinders development of new industry, and it is 
extremely costly and unpredictable.229 These are problems that 
need to be resolved, but the FWS’s proposed rulemaking will not 
solve them. 
As a preliminary matter, the proposed “development of 
voluntary guidance for industry sectors” approach is the current 
state of MBTA enforcement. The MBTA is enforced via 
prosecutorial discretion, and the FWS has announced that it 
takes into account voluntary compliance with FWS guidelines 
when pursuing violations.230 This suggested approach, therefore, 
is not a solution to the problems currently being created by 
uncertainty around the scope of the MBTA. 
The remaining proposed permitting options, the general 
authorization, and the individual permits, also do not solve the 
problems associated with the legal uncertainty surrounding the 
MBTA. First, each of these potential permitting programs would 
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 228. See Bell, supra note 22 (speaking to the practical restraints of the 
proposed permitting programs, as well as their possible shortcomings); Juan 
Carlos Rodriguez, FWS Migratory Bird Permits Could Benefit Industry, Wildlife, 
LAW 360 (June 26, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/672441/fws-migratory-
bird-permits-could-benefit-industry-wildlife (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (reporting 
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 229. Supra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
 230. Supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
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be unpredictable, much as enforcement is now.231 Second, the 
proposed programs have the potential to hinder development in 
the affected industries.232 Third, the permitting options would 
continue to rely heavily on prosecutorial discretion, and perhaps 
exacerbate the problems that are already associated with this 
discretion.233 Finally, and most significantly, the FWS may not 
have the authority under the MBTA to enforce a permitting 
program for incidental take, as the MBTA may not cover 
incidental take.234 
1. Unpredictablity 
According to the notice of intent, the general authorization 
and individual permits would be optional for those that are 
hoping to comply with the MBTA.235 Such a lack of mandate 
leaves open questions as to how the government will apply its 
enforcement provisions to projects that have incidental taking, 
but do not have a permit.236 This uncertainty is similar to the 
uncertainty currently facing the industry—a great deal of 
discretion is left to FWS to determine who to prosecute which 
makes it very difficult for industrial planners to know what to do 
to avoid prosecution. Additionally, the notice makes it clear that 
FWS’s position is that the MBTA covers every unpermitted 
migratory bird death,237 although several courts have found 
otherwise.238 Even with these permitting programs in place, 
industries would be subject to different liabilities depending on 
where they are located—in a jurisdiction where incidental take is 
covered by the MBTA, or in a jurisdiction where it is not. 
Presumably, those industries located in a jurisdiction where the 
MBTA has not been found to include incidental take would not 
                                                                                                     
 231. Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 1. 
 232. Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 2. 
 233. Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 3. 
 234. Infra Part IV, subpart B, section 4. 
 235. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 236. Rodriguez, supra note 228; see generally Migratory Bird Permits, supra 
note 20. 
 237. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 238. Supra notes 135–176 and accompanying text. 
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need a permit, but what of the many industries with operations 
and a presence in multiple jurisdictions? Some companies will 
find that the costs of the permitting programs will not be worth 
it, and thus some industries may continue with relying on the 
current status quo assume the risks associated with the current 
framework of enforcement.239 
These proposals also include the possibility of compensatory 
mitigation.240 Again, this would create similar problems to what 
the industry is facing currently; without strict guidelines as to 
when and what amounts of payments are expected, the 
enforcement may continue to be arbitrary because of the 
discretion left to FWS in choosing how to enforce the rule.241 If 
the permit system “becomes a methodology for the service to get a 
lot of compensatory mitigation where it otherwise wouldn’t have 
been able to request it or impose it, then the industry will 
probably push back and say this is so burdensome it’s really not 
worth it.”242 Additionally, wind and solar industries are currently 
not under consideration for the general authorization, which will 
do nothing to bring legal certainty to these industries as they 
continue to grow in size and importance to the national and 
global economies.243 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Rodriguez, supra note 228 (“If the project developer decides that a 
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 240. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 241. See Gerald George, Migratory Bird Treaty Act Narrowly Interpreted: 
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2. Hindrance of Development 
Each of the proposed rulemaking paths would likely hinder 
development in the affected industries. Most obviously, the 
permit programs and the mitigation requirements have the 
potential to be quite costly to both existing industry facilities 
and those looking to develop.244 The costs associated with the 
permitting program may effectively undermine key federal 
and state policies to encourage the development of certain 
industries, such as broadband wireless245 and wind energy.246 
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 244. See Rodriguez, supra note 236 (discussing the necessity of a 
“grandfathering mechanism” to prevent the unfair, costly, and inefficient result 
of requiring projects that are already complying with the FWS voluntary 
guidelines to apply for new permits); see also NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments 
on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 
2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-
2014-0067-0114&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[T]he program 
should not be retroactive. Requiring existing facilities that are not causing 
significant impacts to bird populations to install additional equipment or take 
action at considerable cost in order to retrofit equipment would be an inefficient 
use of time and resources.”). 
 245. See National Association of Broadcasters, Comments of the National 
Association of Broadcasters (July 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0084&attachment 
Number=1&contentType=pdf (“Imposing new tower siting hurdles on the 
deployment of broadcast and wireless infrastructure at this time will hinder the 
post-incentive auction transition, frustrate federal spectrum policy, and delay 
the offering of new mobile broadband services, contrary to congressional 
intent.”); PCIA—The Wireless Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of 
Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (July 
27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/ contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-
MB-2014-00670112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf 
Rather than expedite wireless broadband deployment and 
availability, the [programmatic environmental impact statement] 
approach would only produce further delay . . . .  These new 
obligations would slow broadband deployment and would increase the 
costs associated with deployment, which ultimately would discourage 
that investment. 
 246. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent 
to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015), https://www. 
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0114& 
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[Next Era Energy] believes the FWS 
should recognize, as the President’s Climate Change Plan recognizes, the 
importance of expanding wind and solar renewable energy . . . . If designed 
improperly, the proposed MBTA rule . . . would be a deterrent to the desired 
growth of renewable energy.”). 
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Several of the comments to the notice of intent raise the 
question of whether these permitting programs are even 
feasible, given the limited resources of FWS.247 The limited 
resources of FWS pose a problem to development because 
delays caused by waiting for a permit can be costly, and 
possibly fatal, to new projects.248 Delays, burdensome review 
processes, and inconsistent administration may also cause 
fewer industry actors to apply for permits, as the risk of 
operating without one will simply outweigh the cost of trying 
to obtain a permit.249  
                                                                                                     
 247. See American Electric Power, Re: Comments Regarding the May 26, 
2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement to Evaluate the Potential Environmental Impacts of a Proposal to 
Authorize Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 24, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0043&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“AEP has concerns that 
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 248. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent 
to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
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Our experience with FWS permitting has been that despite the best 
of intentions, FWS permit programs results in significant delays to 
the advancement of effected projects. For example, the existing 
Special Purpose Utility Salvage permit . . . is a relatively 
straightforward voluntary permit that has now become unusable by 
industry due to unacceptable delays. It has been the experience of the 
wind industry that the salvage permit application, review, and 
approval process has been unnecessarily bloated by requiring 
multiple reviews by understaffed field offices, with no clear review 
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 249. See American Wind Energy Association, Re: Comments regarding the 
May 26, 2015 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement to Evaluate the Potential Environmental Impacts of a 
Proposal to Authorize Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0139&attachment Number=1&contentType=pdf. 
The Service arguably has a poor track record of implementing new (or 
existing) permit programs, which are much less ambitious in the 
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3. Prosecutorial Discretion 
The proposed permitting programs would continue to rely in 
large part on prosecutorial discretion. This is problematic because 
the FWS’s prosecutorial discretion is currently contributing to the 
problem of legal uncertainty around the MBTA, so continued 
reliance on that discretion is not an appropriate way to resolve 
that uncertainty.  
The FWS intends to focus on “sectors whose impacts on 
migratory birds is well known and where practical avoidance 
measures are possible.”250 As is evident by FWS’s incredible 
ranges of estimated bird deaths,251 there is no clear consensus on 
what impact various industries or hazards have on avian 
populations. Certainly there is some evidence that some 
industries have more of an impact than others, but creating a 
permitting program based on such nebulous estimations could 
easily be seen as arbitrary and capricious.252 FWS will ostensibly 
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rules. In fact, only one permit has been issued for a wind project . . . . 
 250. Phillip Taylor, Energy Policy: FWS Moves to Regulate Bird Kills from 
Oil Wells, Power Lines, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (May 22, 2015), 
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with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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 252. See Devon Energy Production Company, Comments on Incidental Take 
of Migratory Birds—Programmatic Impact Statement (July 27, 2015), 
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the PEIS, the Service stated that it focuses its MBTA enforcement activities on 
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Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0084&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[T]he notice provides 
virtually no factual basis to support a conclusion that broadcast towers have a 
significant impact on migratory birds . . . . [T]he Notice’s assertions bout 
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use its discretion to determine a “threshold for impact” to 
determine when a permit is required, and what measures must 
be taken to obtain one.253 
Furthermore, it appears FWS is unsure of the ability to 
regulate or the impact of the wind energy industry, so wind 
hazards are not currently included as a hazard being considered, 
despite recent wind energy prosecutions that would suggest FWS 
recognizes wind energy as a hazard.254 The solar industry is 
completely absent from this permitting consideration.255 The 
combined effect of omitting solar and wind energy from 
consideration, along with FWS’s claim to focus on sectors where 
the impacts are well known, undermines FWS’s credibility 
because it appears that FWS is choosing to favor enforcement 
against some industries and not others.256 “FWS clearly 
contemplates leaving at least some industrial sectors and 
activities out of its permitting program and addressing their 
impacts on migratory birds through the exercise of enforcement 
discretion. The Notice does not indicate the criteria the agency 
will use to draw this line.”257 
Industries do not like to rely on prosecutorial discretion258—it 
has become something of a “sword of Damocles,” with no one 
                                                                                                     
communications towers’ impact on birds are contrary to directly relevant 
evidence found in [a Federal Communications Commission final environmental 
assessment].”); PCIA—The Wireless Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of 
Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (July 
27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-
MB-2014-0067-0112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[T]he FWS 
lacks the factual underpinning necessary to support its proposed actions . . . .”). 
 253. Rodriguez, supra note 228. 
 254. The FWS has solicited comments addressing the feasibility of 
permitting the wind energy sector. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. See 
also supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text (discussing recent 
prosecutions against wind energy developers for violations of the MBTA). 
 255. Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 20. 
 256. See Robert Bryce, Windmills vs. Birds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020478180457726711429483832
8 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (criticizing the presidential administrations for not 
prosecuting wind energy projects that kill birds while vigorously pursuing 
claims against fossil fuel projects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 257. Bell, supra note 22. 
 258. See THOMAS R. LUNDQUIST ET AL., CROWELL & MORING, THE MIGRATORY 
BIRD TREATY ACT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), https://www.crowell.com/files/The-
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quite sure when or where it will fall next.259 The proposed 
regulations simply do not alleviate that problem. 
4. The Problem of Authority 
The most significant problem with the proposed rulemaking 
is that the FWS may not have the authority to regulate incidental 
take in the first place.260 Clearly this is an unresolved question 
given the disagreement in the courts, and FWS can not regulate 
incidental take without the authority to do so given to them by 
statute. 
The issue essentially becomes, whose interpretation of the 
MBTA is the more persuasive? This author asserts that the 
answer is the limited interpretation. Using the canons of 
statutory construction, it becomes clear that the MBTA, as it is 
currently written, does not cover incidental take. 
                                                                                                     
Migratory-Bird-Treaty-Act-An-Overview-Crowell-Moring.pdf (“At present, 
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 259. McKinsey, supra note 71, at 75. 
 260. This issue has been raised by several of the comments submitted to the 
Notice of Intent. See NextEra Energy, Inc., Comments on May 26, 2015 Notice 
of Intent to Prepare Migratory Bird Permit (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0114&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“We believe the weight of 
judicial authority in the U.S. overwhelmingly runs counter to the FWS’s position 
regarding authority over incidental take . . . .”); AES U.S. Services, Re: 
Incidental Take of Migratory Birds (July 27, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0077&attachment Number 
=1&contentType=pdf (“AES does not agree with the Service that the MBTA take 
prohibition was intended to apply to the incidental take of birds during 
otherwise lawful industrial or commercial activity . . . .”); PCIA—The Wireless 
Infrastructure Association, In the Matter of Migratory Bird Permits; 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/ contentStreamer?documentId=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-
0067-0112&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“As recognized by the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the MBTA 
applies only to hunting and poaching activities and does not apply to lawful 
commercial activity . . . .”). 
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First, “when confronted with issues of statutory construction, 
courts begin by examining the plain language of the statute.”261 
To find the plain meaning of the statute, courts “look not only to 
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute 
as a whole and to is object and policy.”262 When a particular term 
has not been defined in the statute, the court then looks to its 
ordinary meaning, or meaning under common law.263 
Take is not defined in the MBTA,264 so the term must be 
construed according to its ordinary meaning or common law 
meaning, unless the legislature has indicated that the term 
does not retain its common law meaning for the purposes of 
this statute. The ordinary meaning of the word take, in the 
context of wildlife, us “to get into one’s hands or into one’s 
possession, power, or control.”265 A further dictionary 
definition is “to get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or 
capturing.”266 The plain meaning of take, which was well-
understood at the time the MBTA was passed,267 conveys that 
take necessitates intentional action that results in taking 
possession of wildlife. Incidental take is not such an action.268 
The plain meaning of take thus supports a narrow 
interpretation of the MBTA.269 
Furthermore, a court must interpret a criminal statute 
narrowly. “When choice has to be made between two readings of 
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, 
                                                                                                     
 261. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (D.N. 
Dak. 2012). 
 262. Crandon v. United States 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). 
 263. See United States v. Shahani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1995) (“[Courts] follow 
the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, 
Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms.”). 
 264. See generally, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 (2012). 
 265. Take, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) (using the word take 
as a term of art in the context of determining whether the right to reduce 
animals to possession is one subject to lawmaking). 
 268. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“One does not reduce an animal to human control accidentally or by 
omission; he does so affirmatively.”). 
 269. This definition is further supported by the MBTA’s implementing 
regulations. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2017) (“Take means to pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect.”). 
CLIPPING THE WINGS OF INDUSTRY 329 
before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that 
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and 
definite.”270 This serves an important constitutional purpose; 
“because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts 
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies ‘the 
instinctive distastes against men languishing in prison unless the 
lawmaker has clearly said they should.’”271 Thus, as a criminal 
statute, the MBTA must be construed narrowly, absent a clear 
direction from the legislature. 
There is no such clear direction from the legislature in the 
MBTA concerning whether the MBTA creates liability for 
incidental take or not as is evident from the circuit split over 
whether the statute encompasses incidental take: “[t]he current 
law . . . is vague and ambiguous as it relates to sanctions for 
lawful, commercial activity that may indirectly injure or kill 
birds.”272 This ambiguity should be resolved in favor of a narrow 
meaning, one that does not encompass incidental take, and one 
which better comports with the strict liability nature of the 
statute. Strict liability means that one can be convicted of 
violating the MBTA without doing so knowingly or intentionally. 
However, in order to be convicted, that person must still commit 
the act voluntarily, or affirmatively.273 By its very definition, 
incidental take is not an affirmative action. Including incidental 
take in the scope of liability under MBTA is thus not consistent 
with the strict liability nature of the statute. 
A narrow interpretation is further supported by the context, 
purpose, and legislative history of the MBTA. As discussed, the 
MBTA was enacted to combat overhunting and poaching.274 This 
                                                                                                     
 270. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 
(1952).  
 271. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (further citations 
omitted). 
 272. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212 (D. N. 
Dak. 2012). 
 273. See United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir. 
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(5th ed. 2010)). 
 274. Supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text. 
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is evident not only from the historical context of the Act, but also 
its legislative history.275 The Senator who introduced the bill 
stated that “this law is aimed at the professional pothunter,”276 
while the opposition to the bill focused on its breadth and 
potential to conflict with property rights.277 This debate 
emphasizes the implausibility of an expansive meaning of the 
statute: “In the wake of court decisions finding earlier laws 
designed to regulate bird hunting unconstitutional, it seems 
unlikely that Congress would have attempted a law so expansive 
as to affect farming, timber harvesting, and window 
installation.”278 This reading is supported by the repeated refusal 
of Congress to expand the law. Congress had the opportunity to 
clarify or extend the statute in 1960 when the “market hunter” 
penalties were added, and in 1974 when the Act was amended to 
include a prohibition on selling illicitly obtained bird parts.279 
The 1974 amendment would have been an opportune time to 
extend or clarify the MBTA, as it was undertaken only a year 
after Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA).280 The 
ESA definition of take includes “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, capture, or collect.”281 The ESA also explicitly 
defines and prohibits incidental take.282 These definitions are 
                                                                                                     
 275. See 56 CONG. REC. 7357 (1918) (statement of Rep. Fess) (stating that 
annual food losses caused by insects require protection of birds from “the market 
hunter”); 56 CONG. REC. 7360 (1918) (statement of Rep. Anthony) (“[T]he people 
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 277. See 55 CONG. REC. 4813 (July 9, 1917) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“[The 
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creation of zones, to tell white men when and where they can hunt, to make it a 
crime for a man to shoot game on his own farm . . . .”). 
 278. Means, supra note 12, at 831–32. 
 279. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982). 
 280. Means, supra note 12, at 832–33. 
 281. 16 U.S.C. § 1532. 
 282. 16 U.S.C. § 1539. 
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clear deviations from the common law meaning of the term take, 
a sign that if Congress intended for the MBTA meaning of take to 
deviate from the common law definition, they would have done so. 
In conclusion, the evidence supports a narrow reading of the 
MBTA. However, while the MBTA does not currently cover 
incidental take, there is nothing preventing the legislature from 
amending the MBTA to expand its reach. 
V. The Need for a Legislative Solution 
The MBTA has a legal problem—there is inconsistent and 
unpredictable enforcement of a statute that has an enormous 
impact on industry. This problem can be resolved judicially, 
through regulations, or legislatively.283 The courts are divided,284 
and unless the Supreme Court chooses to weigh in, do not have 
the power to fix the problem nationwide because their decisions 
are binding only in their jurisdictions. The agencies do not have 
the authority to fix the problem, and by continuing to use 
prosecutorial discretion to enforce the MBTA, may in fact be 
contributing to the issue.285 FWS is attempting to bring more 
certainty to the arena,286 but their chosen method is extremely 
flawed. The best and only reasonable solution is for the 
legislature to amend the MBTA. 
This is a proposal that has been suggested previously,287 but 
it takes on new urgency as these industries are growing and FWS 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 46–54 (discussing the possibility of 
legislative, judicial, or regulatory changes that could reshape the legal 
landscape of the MBTA). 
 284. See supra notes 99–167 (discussing various ways Courts have 
interpreted the MBTA). 
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is attempting to greatly expand their authority through 
rulemaking. 
First, Congress should amend the MBTA to make it clear 
that the criminal provisions do not apply to incidental take. This 
is consistent with the meaning of the statute, and will greatly 
alleviate any legal uncertainty. Congress has amended the MBTA 
before to exclude specific groups or activities from MBTA 
liability,288 so it is not unreasonable for Congress to make this 
type of amendment. The prior amendments to the MBTA 
implicitly recognized that the blanket prohibition and criminal 
penalties imposed by the Act are not an appropriate way to 
protect migratory birds in every scenario, and that the Act must 
adapt.289  
Second, legislators should add a civil penalty provision to the 
MBTA that specifically governs incidental take. In this provision 
incidental take should be defined as it is in the ESA: “take that is 
incidental to, but not the purpose of, otherwise lawful activity.” 290 
A clear definition of incidental take is important to the success of 
an amendment so that there is not potential ambiguity over 
whether a violation falls under the criminal or the civil 
provisions.291 
The civil provisions should allow for the FWS to take civil 
action against an actor that has had incidental take, but the 
                                                                                                     
 288. In 1972, Section 712 was added to the Act to allow the indigenous 
people of the State of Alaska to take migratory birds and their eggs in order to 
satisfy “nutritional and other essential needs, as determined by the Secretary of 
the Interior.” 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2012). In 2002, the National Defense 
Authorization Act, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
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 290. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012). 
 291. For a more thorough discussion, see Minikowski, supra note 95, at 159–
60 (arguing that the MBTA needs to be amended to include a definition of take 
that includes the qualifiers “harass” and “harm” so there is no doubt as to 
whether take is incidental or not). 
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provision should reduce or eliminate liability based on whether 
the deaths were foreseeable, or if the violator had been following 
established best practices for minimizing incidental take. 
Incidental take would be therefore be allowed in specific 
circumstances, subject to specific conditions—a type of 
enforcement that FWS is familiar with, as is evidenced by the 
conditions attached to hunting and the Duck Stamp Program.292 
A civil penalty provision has several benefits. Foremost, civil 
penalties resolve the issue of whether the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and the potential due process 
concerns.293 Civil penalties would also alleviate corporation’s 
fears of reputational harm that accompany criminal prosecutions, 
although civil fines would encourage corporations to take 
measures to prevent incidental take.294 
Furthermore, civil penalties are more adapted to curing the 
problems of reconciling concern for developing modern industry 
and concern for conserving avian life. Criminal penalties serve to 
“deter the criminal conduct at which it is aimed,” however, it is 
not possible to deter the unintentional bird deaths that are 
caused by incidental take.295 Civil penalties better serve the aims 
of the MBTA because they “could include monetary fines, as well 
as injunctive relief to cease the action or remedy the condition 
causing the taking,” and could also help mitigate future taking.296 
The monetary fines can then be channeled directly to the FWS for 
use in conservation efforts. The FWS has successfully run the 
Duck Stamp Program by using hunters to pay for conservation 
efforts297—fines for incidental take can be channeled into 
conservation in a similar fashion. 
                                                                                                     
 292. Supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 293. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 47 (discussing the benefits of civil 
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Finally, civil penalties can be structured in a way that 
removes some of the prosecutorial discretion of FWS. The civil 
provisions should contain an element of foreseeability, and there 
should be a reduction or elimination of liability if the violator has 
followed FWS guidelines for mitigating incidental take. The 
foreseeability requirement is essential; “a civil penalty provision 
with a foreseeability requirement would operate most justly by 
only fining those that realized incidental bird deaths were 
possible, yet did nothing to reasonably prevent them from 
happening.”298 This is also essential to prevent absurd results—
truly unforeseeable bird deaths should not become a basis for 
liability. 
Violators who have followed “best practices” for preventing 
bird deaths should not be liable for incidental take. FWS can 
issue industry-specific standards that detail the best practices in 
each affected industry for minimizing bird deaths, and those 
actors that adhere to those practices and are not negligent will 
have reduced or no liability under the civil provisions. These best 
practice guidelines should undergo notice and comment because 
they will have the force of law, but also because it is important 
for industry actors to weigh in on how best to mitigate bird 
deaths. This solution may be slow, but it is possible—FWS has 
issued voluntary guidelines to industry sectors, showing that they 
are capable of creating such guidelines.299 While these guidelines 
may necessarily have to be updated as industry changes, they 
would provide a much higher level of legal certainty to those who 
may have some incidental take than the current situation. Some 
industries will almost necessarily have incidental take as a 
consequence of their existence—the wind industry is an obvious 
example. However, the solution to this problem is not to paralyze 
those industries with an uncertain legal landscape, but to 
delineate under what conditions these industries may operate. 
This strategy would allow industry actors to determine the 
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 299. See Guidance Documents, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
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legality of their actions prior to acting, and would thus 
unencumber desirable development, while not sacrificing 
migratory birds. 
The civil penalties approach would be in accord with judicial 
decisions on both sides of the circuit split. In the case of FMC, 
FMC was likely negligent in not testing the water discharge and 
ensuring that the chemical treatment was in fact working.300 
Under the proposed civil penalties, FMC would still be found in 
violation of the MBTA, but for negligence and failure to take 
reasonable steps to mitigate bird deaths. In the cases of Seattle 
Audubon and Newton, however, the impact of logging on 
migratory birds was not only indirect, but not obviously 
foreseeable.301 Thus, under the proposed civil provisions, the 
actors would not be liable. 
Civil provisions would greatly alleviate the problems with 
the current legal landscape surrounding the MBTA. They would 
create certainty where there currently is none. 
VI. Conclusion 
Whether they believe that the MBTA should be read broadly 
or narrowly, or if they come from the energy sector, the Audubon 
society, or the government, every commentator and academic 
agrees on one thing: the MBTA must be revised. The century-old 
statute is designed to combat overhunting and poaching; it is not 
designed to deal with the problems facing bird populations today. 
Moreover, it is clear that today’s MBTA is not structured to 
properly protect bird populations in today’s industrial society.302 
FWS is attempting to deal with this problem of enforcement and 
legal predictability by promulgating rules that would allow 
interested parties to get permits for incidental take. This is 
problematic because the FWS does not have the authority under 
the current MBTA to regulate incidental taking. This action will 
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 302. See Ogden, supra note 10, at 1 (“The result [of applying the MBTA to 
combat modern threats to birds] has been uneven enforcement . . . legal 
uncertainty for potential violators, lack of compliance with voluntary guidelines, 
and steady escalating bird deaths.”). 
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inevitably be challenged, bringing many of the underlying 
problems of the current legal landscape around the MBTA to the 
forefront. 
The solution to the problem of uncertainty around the 
MBTA, its enforcement, and its interpretation cannot be 
regulatory—most obviously because the MBTA does not confer on 
the agencies the authority to do so.303 The most appropriate 
solution to these problems is legislative. 
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